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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (“Rule 11”) performs a 
critical, but often overlooked, function in civil disputes. It imposes a 
“signing requirement” on attorneys.
1
 The rule requires attorneys to 
certify that their pleadings and motions have a proper purpose by 
providing their signature as a stamp of approval.
2
 By endorsing filings 
with their signature, attorneys attest that the claims they are submitting 
on behalf of their clients are supported by law or a good faith 
extension of the law
3
 and bolstered by evidence.
4
 Though the signing 
requirement may appear to be little more than a procedural formality, 
“[t]here may be no better example than Federal Rule of Civil 




                                                 





 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990).  
2
 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1). 
3
 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
4
 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). 
5
 Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589 
(1998). 
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“[F]ederal courts exercise considerable discretion and great power 
. . . essential in preserving the rule of law and the rights and liberties of 
the American people, in cases large and small, landmark and 
mundane.”
6
 When a party invokes these powers in a civil case, it 
ignites a “powerful, intimidating, and often expensive” legal process 
that is often vulnerable to abuse by litigants.
7
 This is in part because 
meritless pleadings are distracting, costly, and an impediment to swift 
justice.
8
 Despite the common misconception, Rule 11 is more than a 
toothless, guiding principle. Rather, it regulates attorney conduct by 
discouraging them from pursuing “baseless filings” that can bungle 
proceedings in federal court.
9
  
Rule 11’s regulatory might is rooted in the discretion it gives 
district court judges to levy sanctions.
10
 Rule 11(c) provides that “the 
court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, 
or party that violate[s] the rule or is responsible for the violation.”
11
 
The rule encourages thorough pre-filing investigation by attorneys 
when analyzing their clients’ claims.
12
 To avoid sanctions, lawyers 
and their clients must limit their pleadings and motions to those 
reasonably supported by the law.
13
 The threat of sanctions can be 
“petrifying” for attorneys.
14
 The very existence of Rule 11 is a 
constant reminder of the problems that fester within the federal civil 
                                                 
6
 Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 850 F.3d 880, 883 (7th 
Cir. 2017). 
7
 Id.  
8
 Id. at 883-84. 
9
 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). 
10
 Id. at 399. 
11
 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
12
 Melissa L. Stuart, A Young Lawyer’s Guide to Rule 11 Sanctions, 
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 It serves as “a model and potent tool” for deterring 
and sanctioning misconduct during the early stages of litigation.
16
 
There is currently a circuit split among the United States courts of 
appeals about the procedure attorneys must follow to trigger sanctions 
against opposing counsel.
17
 A plain reading of the rule suggests that 
attorneys must serve a motion upon opposing counsel before filing for 
sanctions with the court pursuant to Rule 11.
18
 This “warning shot” 
provides targeted parties and their legal counsel an opportunity to seek 
“safe harbor” by correcting or withdrawing sanctionable pleadings.
19
 
The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits are unified in demanding strict compliance with this 
procedure.
20
 The Seventh Circuit, however, has developed precedent 
that mere “substantial compliance” is sufficient.
21
 In Northern Illinois 
Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., the Seventh Circuit was presented 
with an opportunity to clarify its position. Part I of this note discusses 
the origins of Rule 11 and explores how the rule has transformed since 
its inception. Part II takes a deeper look at how substantial compliance 
became controlling precedent in the Seventh Circuit and why other 
circuits have chosen not to adopt the same approach. Part III discusses 
the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Northern Illinois Telecom v. 
PNC Bank, N.A. Part IV analyzes the decision and explores the 
arguments for and against the strict and substantial compliance 
interpretations of Rule 11. And, finally, Part V provides a brief 
                                                 
15
 GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW, PERSPECTIVES, AND 
PREVENTIVE MEASURES 2 (Richard G. Johnson ed., 3
rd
 ed. 2004). 
16
 Id. at 2.
 
17
 Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 649 F.3d 539, 
542 (7th Cir. 2011). 
18
 Penn, LLC v. Prosper Business Development Corp. 773 F.3d 764, 767 (6th 
Cir. 2014); Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006). 
19
 Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 850 F.3d 880, 882 (7th 
Cir. 2017). 
20
 Penn, 773 F.3d at 768. 
21
 Matrix IV, 649 F.3d at 553 (7th Cir. 2011); Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee 
County, 333 F.3d 804, 808 (7th Cir. 2003).  
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summation of the note and assesses the likely future of the “substantial 
compliance” rule in the Seventh Circuit. 
 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
  
 Rule 11, at its simplest, is an effort to ensure that attorneys act 
responsibly while advancing their clients’ interests.
22
 The threat of 
sanctions, however, has not always been a factor that attorneys have 
seriously considered when drafting pleadings.
23
 Over time, a series of 
amendments to the rule have manipulated the firmness with which 
courts have applied it. In its original form, Rule 11 was little more 
than a wispy, rarely applied promise.
24
 But, it quickly evolved into a 
disruptive armament wielded by litigators after it was amended in 
1983.
25
 This radical transformation incited the adoption of a safe 
harbor requirement
26
 which is still taking shape today.  
  
A. Pre-1983 Amendments 
  
 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted in 1938.
27
 
Rule 11, in both its original and current form, requires attorneys to 
sign the pleadings, motions, and other filings they submit to the court 
on behalf of their clients.
28
 The signature is an act of “certification” 
that is meant to provide the court confidence that attorneys are 
pursuing legitimate, actionable claims.
29
 From the outset, Rule 11 
                                                 
22
 Vairo, supra note 15, at 5-6.
 
23
 Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 850 F.3d 880, 885 (7th 
Cir. 2017). 
24
 Vairo, supra note 15, at 9-10. 
25
 Id. at 19-20. 
26
 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 Amendment. 
27
 Vairo, supra note 15, at 5. 
28
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provided federal district courts considerable discretion to impose 
sanctions on attorneys that violated the rule’s mandate.
30
 
 The debut of Rule 11 was not the first codified attempt to deter 
attorneys from pursuing frivolous claims.
31
 As early as the mid-
nineteenth century, Judge Joseph Story championed a theory that the 
adoption of an attorney signing requirement would ensure that 
lawsuits were well-grounded in facts and the law.
32
 Rule 24 of the 
Federal Equity Rules of 1842 embraced Story’s recommendation by 
requiring pleadings to contain the signature of the presenting 
attorney.
33
 Similarly, Rule 11 was not the first attempt to sanction 
attorney conduct.
34
 28 U.S.C. § 1927 allowed judges the discretion to 
penalize attorneys who were found to have “unreasonably” inflated the 
cost of litigation.
35
 Yet in comparison with its predecessors, Rule 11 
promised a more direct path for judges to sanction attorneys who 
advanced claims that were frivolous or brought for another improper 
purpose, like delay or the inflation of expenses for the opposing 
party.
36
 The early supporters of Rule 11 had two goals: first, to create 
an environment that cultivated honest attorneys; and, second, to 
“streamline the litigation process.”
37
 
 Rule 11 was ineffective at achieving the idealistic expectations 
that cultivated it. The primary issue underlying Rule 11’s initial 
ineffectiveness was that it held attorneys to a good-faith standard.
38
 
Sanctions were only justified if, in the eyes of the judge, the targeted 
attorney could not muster a “good faith argument” in support of his or 
                                                 
30





 JARED S. SOLOVY & CHARLES M. SHAFFER, RULE 11 AND OTHER 

















 Vairo, supra note 15, at 7. 
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her potentially infringing filing.
39
 This standard was too subjective and 
proved to be too flimsy to function as an useful deterrent.
40
 Instead, 
Rule 11 was a source of “considerable confusion” that failed to 
significantly curtail abuses.
41
 There were “only a handful” of decisions 





B. 1983 Amendments 
  
 Rule 11 was amended for the first time in 1983.
43
 With the rule’s 
shortcomings in mind, the Advisory Committee set out to make the 
rule a more potent force in preventing litigation abuses by reducing 
“reluctance” to impose sanctions.
44
 The drafters of the revisions took 
an aggressive stance against attorney misconduct. The Advisory 
Committee stressed that the courts needed to play a more active role in 




 Perhaps the most impactful change to Rule 11 was the adoption of 
a new standard of conduct.
46
 The rule, in its original form, was 
criticized as too “vague and subjective” because its “good-faith” 
standard tilted the benefit of doubt in favor of infringing parties and 
attorneys.
47
 To cure this perceived flaw, the drafters of the amendment 
heightened the standard from mere good-faith to the more objective 
reasonableness under the circumstances standard.
48
 The Advisory 
Committee intended this change to provide judges with a more 
                                                 
39
 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 399 (1990). 
40
 Vairo, supra note 15, at 7. 
41
 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 Amendment.
 
42
 Vairo, supra note 15, at 47.  
43








 Vairo, supra note 15, at 7.  
48
 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 Amendment.
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objective lens through which to analyze attorney conduct and to 
broaden the “range of circumstances” that would trigger sanctions.
49
 
 Additionally, Rule 11 underwent a series of textual changes that 
sent the message to judges that they needed to impose sanctions more 
frequently.
50
 First, the drafters included the word “sanctions” in the 
text of the rule for the first time.
51
 The new rule “expressly allowed for 
the imposition of expenses, including . . . reasonable attorneys’ 
fees.”
52
 This strategic addition solidified a new commitment to 
penalizing attorneys for violating Rule 11.
53
 Second, the drafters 
removed a provision that allowed judges to simply strike improper 
motions and pleadings.
54
 This provision was “confusing” and rarely 
used.
55
 Most importantly, the rule was redrafted to include the phrase 
“shall impose.”
56
 The new version of Rule 11 tasked judges with an 




 When the 1983 Amendments took effect, some feared that Rule 
11 would continue to be ignored, while others argued that it was still 
too subjective.
58
 Others feared that the drastic changes would lead the 
rule to be aggressively over-applied in unintended ways.
59
 In 1990, the 
United States Supreme Court tackled concerns about Rule 11 
sanctions in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. In Cooter & Gell, the 
Court considered whether a district court could rightfully impose 
sanctions on a plaintiff who voluntarily withdrew a frivolous 
                                                 
49







 Vairo, supra note 15, at 11. 
53






 Vairo, supra note 15, at 11. 
56





 Vairo, supra note 15, at 13. 
59
 Id. at 12-15. 
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 The Court held that judges were required to impose 
sanctions even where the filing at issue was voluntarily withdrawn or 
corrected.
61
 The Supreme Court clung to a “plain meaning” 
interpretation of Rule 11; judges, the Court held, did not have the 
discretion to waive sanctions.
62
 Though the court embraced a black-
letter interpretation of Rule 11, it did not hesitate to identify the rule’s 
shortcomings, noting that it “must be read in light of concerns that it 




C. 1993 Amendments 
  
 The fear that Rule 11 would be “overused” following the 1983 
revisions quickly became a reality.
64
 Over 650 Rule 11 hearings were 
held and recorded between the adoption of the 1983 amendments and 
December 1987, a substantial increase from the “handful” of decisions 
recorded in the previous era.
65
 The revisions were criticized as an 
“over-correction.”
66
 As Rule 11 began facing harsh criticism, 
momentum started to build for a new set of amendments.
67
 An interim 
report that highlighted the flaws of the 1983 revisions was compiled.
68
 
According to the report, Rule 11 chilled attorney creativity, 
discouraged the pursuit of novel arguments, created substantial delays 
in proceedings, and was being applied inconsistently by judges.
69
 Most 
notably, Rule 11 was criticized for exacerbating the “contentious and 
uncooperative behavior” during litigation that the rule was originally 
                                                 
60
 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 388 (1990). 
61
 Id. at 398.  
62
 Id. at 392.  
63
 Id. at 393. 
64
 Vairo, supra note 15, at 13. 
65
 Id. at 47. 
66




 Vairo, supra note 15, at 15. 
68
 Id. at 14. 
69
 Id. at 19-20.
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 The interim report made it clear that there was a 
need for further revisions.
71
 It showed that only 20% of judges favored 
a retreat to the pre-1983 status quo.
72
 The Advisory Committee for the 
1993 amendments needed to discover a middle ground. Rule 11 
required balance.  
 The 1993 amendments “intended to remedy problems” that arose 
with the “interpretation and application of the 1983 revision . . . ."
73
 
Specifically, the committee wanted to “place greater constraints on the 
imposition of sanctions” in order to “reduce the number of motions for 
sanctions” that were delaying proceedings.
74
 Accordingly, the 
committee set out to tighten the spigot on the gush of sanctions that 
were flooding the courts by retreating from the hard line approach it 
embraced only ten years prior.
75
 Judges were once again granted 
“significant discretion” in determining whether sanctions were 
warranted and, if so, how harsh they should be on a case by case 
basis.
76
 The mandate that judges “shall impose” sanctions was relaxed 
to an instruction that they “may impose” them.
77
 Ultimately, the 
committee settled on a softer, more lenient position.
78
 This, it was 
believed, signaled to judges and attorneys that they should be “less 
zealous in using Rule 11” during litigation, especially “where there 
were relatively minor infractions . . . .”
79
 
 Further, the revised Rule 11 included a new provision that 
mandated advance notice of impending sanctions to attorneys that 
risked facing sanctions before they could be imposed.
80
 This 
                                                 
70


















 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
78





 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 Amendment.
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procedural hurdle was added to provide at-risk attorneys an 
“opportunity to respond” to opposing parties that threatened 
sanctions.
81
 All “requests for sanctions” required a separate motion to 
be served on attorneys to warn them that sanctions were being 
threatened.
82
 This practice, the committee hoped, would provide 
potentially infringing attorneys a chance to correct or withdraw their 
pleadings and avoid triggering costly satellite litigation.
83
  
 More precisely, the revised Rule 11 required attorneys who 
intended to pursue sanctions to wait at least 21 days after service 
before officially filing the motion with the court.
84
 This addition to the 
Rule was intended to provide a “warning shot” to attorneys who might 
be in violation of the rule a chance to seek safe harbor.
85
 It, in turn, 
provided lawyers security form sanctions by giving them an 
opportunity to re-certify their filings.
86
 
 The safe harbor provision was adopted to fulfill the “streamlining 
purpose originally envisioned by the 1983 architects of Rule 11.”
87
 
The new rule imposed a 21 day safe harbor period.
88
 Though this 
would cause minor delays, it would save time and costs in the 
aggregate because it allowed attorneys to abandon frivolous claims 
and avoid triggering even more time consuming and costly satellite 
litigation.
89
 The 1993 amendment refocused the purpose of Rule 11 as 
a mechanism for clarifying the issues and merits of the case rather than 
a mechanism to punish attorneys.
90
 By allowing safe harbor, Rule 11 
finally found the appropriate balance needed to effectively combat 
frivolous motions and pleadings. 
                                                 
81


















 Vairo, supra note 15, at 32. 
88
 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). 
89
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II. HISTORY OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE 
 
The 1993 amendments drew back the “fangs” of Rule 11.
91
 
After the changes took effect, district courts quickly aligned with the 
new rule’s “relax[ed]” standards of liability,
92
 and the circuit courts 
began to reinforce that sanctions were again discretionary, not 
mandatory.
93
 The adjustments to the rule were successful at placing 
new constraints on judge’s ability to impose sanctions.
94
 But, the new 
Rule 11 was not immune to criticism or confusion. Some judges 
reacted unfavorably to the new safeguards.
95
 This distaste materialized 
in the Seventh Circuit’s unique interpretation of the safe harbor 
provision. 
  
A. Emergence of Substantial Compliance 
  
 In 2003, the Seventh Circuit adopted a novel interpretation of 
Rule 11 when resolving an appeal of a district court decision that 
denied sanctions. In Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee County, the plaintiff 
brought a 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 claim against his government employer 
for allegedly violating his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
96
 
Nisenbaum, a security supervisor for Milwaukee County, argued that 
he was improperly stripped of his job as retaliation because he ran for 
County Clerk.
97
 The magistrate judge and the Seventh Circuit agreed 
that Nisenbaum’s claims were patently frivolous because the county 
passed a budget that phased out Nisenbaum’s position before he began 
                                                 
91
 Pierre v. Inroads, Inc., 858 F.Supp. 769, 774 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 
92
 Vairo, supra note 15, at 77. 
93
 Knipe v. Skinner, 19 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1994).  
94
 Vairo, supra note 15, at 77-80. 
95
 Knipe, 867 F. Supp. at 763 n. 12. 
96
 Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee County, 333 F.3d 804, 806 (7th Cir. 2003). 
97
 Id. at 806.
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 The Seventh Circuit, however, disagreed with the 
magistrate judge on whether sanctions were warranted.
99
 
 The magistrate judge determined that Nisenbaum’s claim was 
“frivolous from the get-go” and was sanctionable under Rule 11(c),
100
 
but refused to enforce sanctions because the defendants failed to 
adhere to the procedure required by Rule 11(c)(2) which states that a 
motion must be served on a party facing sanctions.
101
 Milwaukee 
County did not serve Nisenbaum with a motion nor did it file a motion 
with the district court.
102
 Instead, the county simply sent Nisenbaum’s 
attorney a letter in which it threatened sanctions.
103
 Despite the 




 When explaining the denial of sanctions, the magistrate judge 
noted that his decision to do so was “technical” because if the 
defendant provided notice by service of a motion, then sanctions 
would have been warranted.
105
 The Seventh Circuit disagreed. “A 
serious request for sanctions is entitled to more than a brushoff,” wrote 
Circuit Judge Easterbrook.
106
 On review, the Seventh Circuit 
remanded the case to the court below with instruction that the 
defendants were “entitled to a decision on the merits of their request 
for sanctions.”
107
 The court reconciled the lack of procedural 
compliance with the safe harbor provision by finding that the 
defendants “complied substantially” with Rule 11(c)(2).
108
 By 
providing informal notice to Nisenbaum and giving him 21 days to 
                                                 
98
 Nisenbaum, 333 F.3d at 807.
 
99




















 Id. at 811.
 
107
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 The Seventh Circuit has consistently recognized substantial 
compliance with Rule 11(c) as sufficient grounds for sanctions.
110
 The 
court explained the merits of a substantial compliance approach in 
Matrix IV, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago.
111
 
In Matrix IV, the plaintiff brought a common law fraud claim against 
the defendant in district court even though a similar fraud claim had 
already failed in bankruptcy court.
112
 The district court found against 
Matrix IV, Inc. (“Matrix”) on the grounds of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel.
113
 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit confirmed that 
the suit was properly dismissed.
114
 The Seventh Circuit agreed with 
the district court that sanctions were not warranted in Matrix IV, but 
did so on different grounds.
115
 
 In district court, Matrix was spared the burden of sanctions 
because the defendant’s method of notice was “procedurally 
defective.”
116
 Notice was sent to Matrix in the form of a letter from 
opposing counsel explicitly threatening sanctions against Matrix if the 
claims against the defendant were not dismissed.
117
 The letter was sent 
almost two years prior to the eventual dismissal of the claim, and the 
defendants, in turn, moved for sanctions three weeks after the 
                                                 
109
 Nisenbaum, 333 F.3d at 808.
 
110
 Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 850 F.3d 880, 886-87 
(7th Cir. 2017).; Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 649 
F.3d 539, 552 (7th Cir. 2011); Nisenbaum, 333 F.3d at 808. 
111
 Matrix IV, 649 F.3d at 552; see also Fabriko Acquisition Crop v. Prokos, 
536 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing that an informal letter is sufficient to 
start the “21-day window to withdraw or correct the claim” so long as a formal 
motion is submitted to the court to trigger sanctions).
 
112
 Matrix IV, 649 F.3d at 541-42.
 
113
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 Though the defendants did not serve Matrix with an 
official motion at least 21 days prior to filing for sanctions, the 
Seventh Circuit ruled for the defendants, stating “motions for 
sanctions are permissible so long as the moving party substantially 
complies with Rule 11’s safe harbor requirement.”
119
 In this case, like 
in Nisenbaum, the Seventh Circuit held that the method of notice was 
sufficient to serve as proper notice and trigger sanctions.
120
 Though 
the court ultimately agreed with the district court that sanctions were 





B. Opposition to Substantial Compliance 
 
The Seventh Circuit is currently the only circuit that recognizes 
substantial compliance with Rule 11(c)(2).
122
 It is the only circuit to 
recognize that proper notice can come in the form of an informal 
letter.
123
 Most other circuits require strict compliance based on the 




Substantial compliance has been met by other circuits with 
disapproval. In Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179 (2006), the Tenth Circuit 
explicitly rejected and openly criticized the substantial compliance 
test.
125
 There, the plaintiff alleged that a “stop and search” performed 
by police officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
126
 The court 





 Matrix IV, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 649 F.3d 539, 
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held that the plaintiff failed to establish a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.S. § 
1983.
127
 Defense counsel sent informal warning letters more than 21 
days before filing for Rule 11 sanctions with the court,
128
 yet defense 
counsel never officially served the plaintiff’s with a motion in 
compliance with Rule 11(c)(2).
129
 In its decision, the Roth court 
considered whether substantial compliance with Rule 11 could be 
enough to impose sanctions, but ultimately sided against the Seventh 
Circuit by determining that strict compliance with Rule 11(c)(2) was 
necessary.
130
 It found Nisenbaum to be “unpersuasive . . . because it 
contain[ed] no analysis of the language of Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or the 
Advisory Committee Notes, cite[d] to no authority for its holding, and 




Similarly, Penn, LLC v. Prosper Bus. Dev. Corp., a Sixth Circuit 
case, also explicitly rejected and openly criticized the substantial 
compliance test, instead favoring strict compliance and a plain reading 
interpretation of Rule 11.
132
 It roundly criticized the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Nisenbaum for its failure to “address any of the textual or 





III. NORTHERN ILLINOIS TELECOM, INC. V. PNC BANK, N.A.  
  
Recently, the Seventh Circuit was presented an opportunity to 
review its stance on Rule 11(c)(2). Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. 
PNC Bank, N.A. presented the question whether informal letters that 
threaten sanctions can substantially comply with the safe harbor 












 Penn, LLC v. Prosper Business Development Corp., 773 F.3d 764, 768 (6th 
Cir. 2014). 
133
 Id. at 768. 
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provision when the letters do not explicitly specify that plaintiff’s 
counsel has 21 days to correct or withdraw the pleadings and when 
defense counsel neglects to serve the targeted party with a formal 
motion.
134
 Ultimately, the court held that letters threatening sanctions 
do not substantially comply with Rule 11(c)(2) if they do not expressly 




A. Facts of the Case 
 
In 2007, MidAmerica Bank merged with National City Bank.
136
 
As part of the transition, Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. (NITEL) was 
subcontracted to outfit four branches owned by these banks in the 
Chicagoland area with communications cabling.
137
 The contractor for 
the project, Nexxtworks, determined that there were “quality 
problems” with the installation at the four branches and withheld a 
portion of the payment promised to NITEL for failure to perform.
138
 
As a result, other subcontractors needed to be hired to correct and 
complete NITEL’s work.
139
 In 2009, Nexxtworks filed for bankruptcy 
and listed the contested amount as disputed debt.
140
 NITEL sought to 
recover $115,000 in bankruptcy court, but the claim was dismissed 
because NITEL missed the deadline.
141
 In the interim, each of the 
bank branches where the work was performed was acquired by PNC 
Bank, N.A. (PNC Bank).
142
  
                                                 
134
 NITEL, 850 F.3d at 881-82. 
135
 Id. at 888. 
136
 Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, NA (NITEL I), No. 12 C 
2372, 2014 WL 4244069 at *2 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 27, 2014). 
137
 Id. at *1. 
138
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In 2012, NITEL filed a breach of contract claim against PNC 
Bank seeking to recover $81,300 for the work performed plus fees and 
costs.
143
 PNC Bank, as defendant, successfully removed the case from 
state court to the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division 
because there was complete diversity of citizenship between the 
parties and the amount in controversy was greater than $75,000.
144
 
PNC Bank moved for summary judgment arguing that neither it, nor 
any of the bank branches it acquired, actually entered into a contract 
with NITEL.
145
 The contracts at issue, PNC Bank contended, were 
between NITEL and Nexxtworks.
146
 District Judge Amy J. St. Eve 
agreed
147
 finding that NITEL “failed to submit any evidence that a 
contract existed” with PNC Bank or its predecessors.
148
 Accordingly, 
summary judgment was granted for PNC Bank because NITEL failed 
to establish a “genuine issue of material fact.”
149
  
The district court’s grant of summary judgment did not conclude 
litigation, however. In a footnote, District Judge St. Eve noted that that 
defense counsel “might seek sanctions under Rule 11.”
150
 During 
discovery, PNC Bank’s attorney, Jim Crowley, threatened sanctions 
against NITEL and plaintiff’s counsel, Robert Riffner, twice.
 151
 On 
July 31, 2012, Crowley wrote his first letter to Riffner.
152
 The letter 
explained that it was apparent that NITEL never contracted with PNC 
Bank or any of its predecessors and unless the complaint was 
dismissed the defendants would pursue “sanctions under Federal Rule 




 NITEL, 850 F.3d at 882. 
145
 Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, NA (NITEL I), No. 12 C 
2372, 2014 WL 4244069 at *5 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 27, 2014). 
146
 Id. at *4. 
147






 Id. at *5 n.3. 
151
 Id. at *1-2. 
152
 Id. at *1. 
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11 against NITEL and your firm . . . .”
153
 The defendant filed a motion 
to compel discovery.
154
 In March 2013, the magistrate judge who 
presided over the hearing determined that NITEL had the burden of 
proof to provide evidence that it entered into a contract with PNC 
Bank.
155
 On April 2, 2013, Crowley wrote a second letter warning 
Riffner that defense counsel intended to move for summary judgment 
and Rule 11 sanctions.
156
 The letter alleged that the claim was 
“frivolous” and, for that reason, Riffner never should have accepted 
the case.
157
 Riffner did not respond to either letter.
158
  
District Judge Robert Blakey of the Northern District of Illinois 







 First, on the merits, the claim was clearly 
frivolous.
162
 NITEL maintained throughout the litigation that they 
contracted with PNC, but failed to provide even a shred of useful 
evidence supporting the claim.
163
 Second, in terms of procedure, PNC 
gave sufficient notice to NITEL because it substantially complied with 
Rule 11(c)(2).
164
 Summary judgment was granted on August 27, 2014, 
and on October 21, 2014 PNC Bank filed a motion for Rule 11 
sanctions against NITEL and Riffner.
165
 Crowley warned Riffner 
twice, first in 2012, and again on April 2, 2013, thereby providing 
Riffner far more time than the 21 days of safe harbor demanded under 




 Id. at *2. 
155
 Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, NA (NITEL II), No. 12 C 
2372, 2015 WL 1943271 at *2 (N.D.Ill. Apr. 29, 2015). 
156




 Id. *1-2. 
159
 Id. at *5. 
160
 Id. at *6. 
161
 Id. at *9. 
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 Id. at *4. 
165
 Id. at *3. 
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Rule 11(c)(2). Crowley, however, never served NITEL with a formal 
motion threatening sanctions.
166
 Further, Crowley did not specify in 
either letter how much time NITEL had to withdraw or correct its 
pleadings before he would seek to pursue sanctions.
167
 But according 





B. Hamilton’s Majority 
 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision imposing sanctions.
169
 According to Circuit Judge Hamilton, 
who wrote for the majority, the sanctions were improper even though 
the Seventh Circuit is uniquely lenient when assessing compliance 
with Rule 11(c)(2).
170
 The court held that the letters sent by PNC 
Bank’s counsel to Riffner fell “far short” of substantial compliance 
with the safe harbor requirement.
171
  
Riffner appealed on both substantive and procedural grounds.
172
 
He needed to establish an abuse of discretion by the district court 
judge on either basis to reverse the district court’s decision.
173
 First, 
the court confidently affirmed that the sanctions were substantively 
justified.
174
 NITEL’s position that PNC Bank was liable for breach of 
contract was “objectively baseless” because no contract ever existed 
between the parties.
175
 The claim was frivolous and, thus, violated 
Rule 11(b)(2). 
                                                 
166
 Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, N.A., 850 F.3d 880, 886 (7th 
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167
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The court then probed the procedural merits of Riffner’s appeal. In 
the opinion, Hamilton first addressed whether PNC Bank strictly 
complied with Rule 11.
176
 The two letters sent from PNC Bank’s 
attorney to Riffner “simply did not comply” with Rule 11(c)(2).
177
 The 
rule requires the party seeking sanctions to serve the targeted party 
with a motion threatening sanctions.
178
 The threatening party then 
must wait at least 21 days after providing notice of impending 
sanctions before filing the motion with the court to allow the targeted 
party an opportunity to correct or withdraw the contested filing.
179
 
PNC Bank never served NITEL or Riffner with a motion.
180
 In most 
circuits, the analysis would have ended here.  
But, in accordance with circuit precedent, the court then analyzed 
whether the two letters that PNC Bank’s attorney sent to Riffner 
substantially complied with Rule 11’s safe harbor requirement.
181
 
Though the district court ruled that PNC Bank's two “settlement 
offers” sent to Riffner were “sufficient warning shots” to establish 
substantial compliance with Rule 11, the Seventh Circuit disagreed.
182
 
According to Hamilton, “[t]he Rule 11 threats did not transform PNC 
Bank’s settlement offers into communications that substantially 
complied” with Rule 11’s safe harbor requirement.
183
 Though he did 
not provide detail, Hamilton indicated that to be substantially 
compliant with Rule 11, a letter that threatens sanctions must establish 
that the “opposing party is serious” and also specify “when the 21-day 
safe-harbor clock starts to run.”
184
  
Hamilton did not stop at reversing the district court’s decision to 
sanction Riffner. Though the court decided this case within the 
                                                 
176








 Id. at 886. 
181




 Id. at 888. 
184
 Id,.at 886. 
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framework of existing Seventh Circuit precedent, Hamilton was 
candid about his reservations against the substantial compliance 
interpretation of Rule 11(c)(2) moving forward. The final footnote of 
the decision warned that those who “rely on a theory of substantial 
compliance should understand that, at least in the present landscape, 





C. Posner’s Dissent 
 
Former Circuit Judge Posner responded with a brief, scathing 
dissent that criticized the majority opinion and disparaged Riffner. 
Posner scorned at his colleague’s hesitancy to “punish misbehaving 
lawyers . . . .”
186
 Riffner was a “boor”, Posner accused. His pursuit of 
such a hopelessly frivolous claim, and his failure to respond to 




Posner felt that the case presented a “good example of substantial 
compliance” and, therefore, he would have affirmed the district court 
judge’s decision to impose sanctions.
188
 Posner argued that the letters 
sent by PNC Bank demanding withdrawal of the lawsuit were 
sufficient to provide Riffner notice of impending sanctions.
189
 Though 
PNC failed to serve Riffner with a motion as required by Rule 




                                                 
185
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IV. ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 
 
In NITEL, the Seventh Circuit had the chance clear up the 
confusion surrounding its unique, controversial interpretation of the 
safe harbor provision. But, ultimately, it balked at the opportunity. 
 
A. NITEL’s Shortcomings 
 
The court could have overturned past precedent. The Seventh 
Circuit has subscribed to a substantial compliance interpretation of 
Rule 11 since Nisenbaum.
191
 A decision to overturn the court’s current 
commitment to substantial compliance would have aligned the 
Seventh Circuit with every other circuit that has addressed this 
issue.
192
 To do so, the court could have determined that the letters sent 
from Crowley to Riffner were in fact substantially compliant with 
Rule 11(c)(2), but that substantial compliance is, and always has been, 
an improper reading of the rule.  
The letters at issue in NITEL seemed to be substantially compliant 
with Rule 11(c)(2). The first letter from Crowley to Riffner “offered to 
settle the matter in exchange for a dismissal order and a check to cover 
PNC’s attorney fees and costs. . . .”
193
 A failure to comply, Crowley 
threatened, would prompt PNC to seek “sanctions under Federal Rule 
11 . . . .”
194
 This letter was sent to Riffner on July 31, 2012.
195
 
Crowley sent another letter that was functionally the same as the first 
one on April 2, 2013.
196
 The letters explicitly threatened that Rule 11 
sanctions would be pursued if the NITEL did not withdraw or correct 
                                                 
191
 NITEL, 850 F.3d at 881. 
192
 Penn, LLC v. Prosper Business Development Corp. 773 F.3d 764, 768 (6th 
Cir. 2014). 
193
 Northern Illinois Telecom, Inc. v. PNC Bank, NA (NITEL II), No. 12 C 
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 NITEL had more than 21 days to withdraw or correct 
its pleading. PNC Bank moved for summary judgment on September 
8, 2013 and filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions on October 21, 
2014.
198
 More than two years elapsed between the first explicit, but 
informal, threat of sanctions and PNC Bank’s motion for summary 
judgment. Nonetheless, the court held that the procedure fell “far 
short” of substantial compliance.
199
 
Alternatively, the court could have doubled down on its 
commitment to substantial compliance. Based on the explicit threats 
for Rule 11 sanctions communicated in Crowley’s letters and the 
extensive time allowed by Crowley before moving for summary 
judgment and sanctions, the court could have affirmed the district 
court’s decision by holding that the letters were substantially 
compliant with Rule 11(c)(2). By specifically identifying why 
Crowley’s letters were substantially compliant with the Rule, the court 
could have provided the clarity that the substantial compliance 
interpretation has always lacked. Additionally, the court could have 
laid out its policy arguments supporting the merits of the substantial 
compliance interpretation. NITEL provided the Seventh Circuit an 
opportunity to supply the justification for substantial compliance it has 
always neglected to provide.  
Instead, the court settled on a limited, narrow holding. The court 
reversed the district court’s ruling, holding that Crowley’s informal 
letters to Riffner were not substantially compliant with Rule 
11(c)(2).
200
 By reversing, the court affirmed circuit precedent. 
Substantial compliance is still the controlling theory in the Seventh 
Circuit.
201
 Of course, providing narrow decisions is within the court’s 
right. But in this case, the Seventh Circuit missed an opportunity to 
explain the merits of substantial compliance.  




 Id. at *3. 
199
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By neglecting to clarify why Crowley’s letters fell short of 
substantial compliance, it missed an important opportunity to provide 
guidance to litigating attorneys and district courts judges tasked with 
enforcing the standard. The court’s sheepishness in NITEL generated 
confusion for district court judges. Recently in Knapp v. Evgeros, Inc., 
Judge Feinerman of the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division 
highlighted the mixed message that the Seventh Circuit sent to the 
lower courts with NITEL. Citing Matrix IV, Judge Fienerman noted 
that “a letter informing the opposing party of the intent to seek 
sanctions and the basis for the imposition of sanctions . . . is sufficient 
for Rule 11 purposes.”
202
 But, the Seventh Circuit appeared to be 
“within a cat’s whisker of overruling [substantial compliance]” in 
NITEL.
203
 Since substantial compliance remains precedent, the judge 




Knapp proves that district courts within the Seventh Circuit are 
being held hostage by the Seventh Circuit’s reluctance to clarify its 
substantial compliance doctrine. There are no clear benchmarks that 
separate letters that are substantially compliant with Rule 11 from 
those that fall short. District courts have been left to piece together 
sparse decisions like Nisenbaum and NITEL and are struggling to find 
consistency. The district courts, as a result, seem to be creating their 
own tests. Knapp proposed that Rule 11 sanctions can be sought “only 
on the grounds set forth in the letter.”
205
 The court “may not consider 
any grounds set forth in the motion that were not articulated in the 
letter…”
206
 In Momo Enters., LLC v. Banco Popular of N. Am., the 
Northern District of Illinois decided that substantial compliance is met 
where parties are provided “an opportunity to correct their purported 
                                                 
202
 Knapp v. Evgeros, Inc. 15 C 754, 2017 WL 3668165 at *5 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 
24, 2017) (citing Matrix IV, 649 F.3d at 552). 
203




 Id. at *5. 
206
 Id. at *6. 
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 But the district court, much like the Seventh Circuit, 




Judge Hamilton’s warning that reliance on a substantial 
compliance is inviting “possible en banc and/or Supreme Court” 
review indicates that the issue is ripe for a deeper look.
209
 Between the 
slanted circuit split and the lack of guidance the Seventh Circuit has 
provided to the district courts on this issue, substantial compliance will 
likely come under review again.  
 
B. The Future of Rule 11(c)(2) in the Seventh Circuit 
 
If the Seventh Circuit is presented with a case that allows it to 
address the merits of substantial compliance in the future, it will need 
to consider a variety of factors in deciding the fate of the substantial 
compliance rule.  
 
1. The Case for Strict Compliance 
 
One factor tilting against substantial compliance is its failure to 
adhere to the plain language requirements of Rule 11. It is undeniable, 
as many circuits have pointed out, that Rule 11(c)(2) requires motion a 




                                                 
207
 Momo Enters., LLC v. Banco Popular of N. Am., No. 15-cv-11074, 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161827 at *8-9 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 30, 2017) (holding that a party’s 
motion for sanctions did not substantially comply with Rule 11 when it was served 




 NITEL, 850 F.3d at 889 n.5. 
210
 See Penn, LLC v. Prosper Business Development Corp. 773 F.3d 764, 768 
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have held informal letters without a motion are insufficient to trigger the 21 day safe 
harbor period because they do not strictly comply with Rule 11). 
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Further, a commitment to substantial compliance, especially a 
poorly defined version of substantial compliance, can increase the use 
of abusive litigation tactics by attorneys. The dramatic increase in 
sanctions in the 1980’s highlighted the downside of a legal system that 
allowed frequent, burdensome sanctioning.
211
 The 1983 version of the 
Rule 11 allowed sanctions to become “a favorite weapon in litigators’ 
briefcases, often used and even more often brandished to threaten.”
212
 
Attorneys are more likely to threaten sanctions as a litigation tactic if 
the threat can be executed at no cost through an informal letter. 
Other reasons to overturn substantial compliance precedent align 
with the arguments that motivated the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11. 
Arguably, the substantial compliance rule is more likely to chill 
attorney creativity and zealousness in pursuing novel arguments.
213
 If 
the ease of triggering sanctions is increased, attorneys may be more 
hesitant to commit to some claims and be more cautious in pursuing to 
some arguments. This effect would be compounded if substantial 
compliance rests on uneasy footing with unclear criteria. Additionally, 
a commitment to substantial compliance could generate more satellite 
litigation than adherence to strict compliance of Rule 11. In the long 
term, informal notice of sanctions will likely generate more Rule 11 
hearings which can be costly and time consuming. 
A key argument against strict compliance is that it is unnecessarily 
formalistic and costly.
214
 Filing a motion to trigger the safe harbor 
requirement does increase the financial burden to the party at the 
wrong end of an improper filing. Arguably, there is a financial 
disincentive for aggrieved parties to move for sanctions. The court 
reserves the right, however, to demand a “for cause” showing of a 
proper purpose if it so wishes.
215
 On the court's own initiative, it may 
“order an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why conduct . . . 
                                                 
211
 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993 Amendment. 
212
 NITEL, 850 F.3d at 885. 
213
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214
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has not violated Rule 11(b).”
216
 The court can enact sanctions sua 
sponte if it so desires.
217
 Therefore, an aggrieved party may not need 
to pay the costs for a motion where a filing is particularly egregious.
218
 
Additionally, an aggrieved party that is confident that an opposing 
party’s filing is improper will be reimbursed if sanctions are 
determined to be warranted by the district court judge.
219
 The court has 
the discretion to “award to the prevailing party the reasonable 




2. The Case for Substantial Compliance 
 
There seems to be some merit behind substantial compliance once 
the plain meaning of Rule 11(c)(2) is set aside. According to the Rule 
11(c)(1), “[i]f, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, 
the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may 
impose an appropriate sanction. . . .”
221
 If looking simply at the 
general mandate of Rule 11, substantial compliance may be sufficient.  
One of the most persuasive arguments against the strict 
compliance interpretation of Rule 11 is the inherent conflict it creates 
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1. Rule 1 defines the scope and 
purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
222
 The rules, it sets 
forth, “should be construed, administered, and employed by the court 
and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action and proceeding.”
223
 Rule 11 contradicts 




 Douglas R. Richmond, Alternative Sanctions in Litigation, 47 N.M. L. Rev. 
2019, 215-16 (2017) (discussing the court’s power to impose sanctions on its own 
initiative, which requires a higher standard for sanctions, but reduces the risk that 
attorneys will bring claims with an improper purpose knowing opposing party might 
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Rule 1. The rules should be administered to ensure “speedy” 
proceedings.
224
 By requiring 21 days safe harbor before allowing a 
motion for sanctions to be filed, it artificially slows down the 
proceedings for at least three weeks. Another area of contradiction is 
the instruction that the rules should be construed to ensure that 
proceedings are “inexpensive.”
225
 Strict compliance with Rule 11 
increases the financial demand on the threatening party. By requiring 
an official motion, Rule 11 increases attorney fees and filing costs for 
the party who is being wronged. Substantial compliance theory is 
consistent with Rule 1. In comparison, strict compliance is arguably 
unnecessarily formalistic and contrary to the scope and purpose of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Though the Rule 11(c)(2) is widely accepted and often celebrated, 
it is not without flaws. One of the main arguments against the safe 
harbor provision is that it increases short-term costs and burdens on 
the aggrieved party. The safe harbor provision provides attorneys a 
second chance at recertification that was previously unprecedented. 
Additionally, the security provided by the safe harbor requirement 
may reduce the quality of attorney pleadings and motions. Attorneys 
may be more cavalier when presenting filings to the court. They may 
be more willing to take a risk, knowing that they can retreat if the 
filing is challenged by the opposing party. By reducing the threat of 
sanctions, attorneys may be less likely to conduct reasonable inquiry 




The outstanding question that remains for the Seventh Circuit to 
address is whether its substantial compliance interpretation can be 
crafted in a way that avoids the ills sought to be addressed by  the 
1983 Amendments. It is unclear whether there is a middle ground 
between the Seventh Circuit’s poorly supported substantial 
compliance interpretation and Rule 11(c)(2). Notably, substantial 
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compliance is not mere or minimal compliance. The outcomes in 
Matrix and NITEL show that not every party that moves for sanctions 
will be successful. Substantial compliance is still a relatively high bar. 
But, all in all, it is important to remember that the key goal for 
Rule 11 is deterrence, not punishment.
226
 The evolution of Rule 11 
conforms that sanctions are not meant to be punitive. The arguments in 
support of the Seventh Circuit’s substantial compliance interpretation 
of Rule 11(c)(2) are not persuasive enough to ignore the plain 
language of the rule that says a motion must be served on the opposing 
party. The emergence of a drastic circuit split and the Seventh 
Circuit’s hesitance to clearly define what exactly substantial 
compliance with Rule 11(c)(2) should look like do not bode well for 
substantial compliance’s future. The legal system does not often allow 
second chances, but Rule 11 is an important exception. Rule 11 
sanctions exist to enhance the quality of pleadings, motions, and other 
papers. A softer, more flexible rule that allows for a warning shot and 
safe harbor is more consistent with the intent and purpose of the rule 
than the alternative. 
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